Adam Jacobsson ()
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Adam Jacobsson: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: This paper models a two-period media contest between two political
candidates campaigning to win an election. Two main cases
are examined. In the first case voters behave as unbiased Bayesian
updaters when assessing political information. The second case considers
voters suffering from confirmatory bias. In the first case I find
that candidates spend equal amounts of their campaign funds in both
periods in equilibrium. In the second case, candidates spend more
in period one. A candidate with better media access (in period one)
does, however, better if voters suffer from confirmatory bias than if
they do not.
Keywords: Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias. Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias. Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias. Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias
25 pages, January 29, 2002
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