Peter Bohm: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: In discussions about the policy design of domestic emission trading, e.g., when implementing the Kyoto Protocol, the two permit allocation alternatives auctioning and allocation gratis (grandfathering) are often pitted against each other as representing utopian cost-effectiveness and political realism, respectively. In this note, an attempt is made to extract the main points of a comparison between the two options with respect to efficiency and distribution.
7 pages, April 20, 2002
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