Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Research Papers in Economics,
Stockholm University, Department of Economics
No 2003:5: Blowing the Whistle
Jose Apesteguia (), Martin Dufwenberg () and Reinhard Selten
Additional contact information
Jose Apesteguia: Public University of Navarre, Postal: Public University of Navarre, Campus de ArrosadÃa, 31006 Pamplona, , , ,
Martin Dufwenberg: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Reinhard Selten: University of Bonn
Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication
29 pages, May 6, 2003
Full text files
wp03_05.pdf
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