Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Research Papers in Economics,
Stockholm University, Department of Economics

No 2003:5: Blowing the Whistle

Jose Apesteguia (), Martin Dufwenberg () and Reinhard Selten
Additional contact information
Jose Apesteguia: Public University of Navarre, Postal: Public University of Navarre, Campus de Arrosadía, 31006 Pamplona, , , ,
Martin Dufwenberg: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Reinhard Selten: University of Bonn

Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication

JEL-codes: C92; D43; L13

29 pages, May 6, 2003

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