Rikard Forslid ()
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Rikard Forslid: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Using a simple monopoly model, this note analyses the incentives of a vaccine producer. Because a vaccine tends to eradicate the disease for wich it is intended, it also tends to destroy its own market. This means that monopolistic producers may be tempted, in a socially non-optimal way, to delay the introduction of vaccines against new infections until the disease has spread.
Keywords: Vaccines
JEL-codes: D42; D62; H10; I18; L10
5 pages, First version: February 22, 2005. Revised: February 6, 2006.
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wp05_02rev.pdf
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