Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Research Papers in Economics,
Stockholm University, Department of Economics
No 2010:7: Democracy as a Middle Ground: A Uni…ed Theory of Development and Political Regimes
Anna Larsson () and Stephen Parente ()
Additional contact information
Anna Larsson: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Stephen Parente: University of Illinois, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1407 W. Gregory Dr., Urbana, IL, 61801, USA.
Abstract: A large literature documents that autocratic regimes have not, on average, outperformed democratic regimes, although they do display greater variance in economic performance. At the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. This paper puts forth a theory to account for these observations. The theory rests on the idea that autocratic leaders are heterogenous in their preferences and the idea that special interest groups can successfully lobby a democratic regime for policies that delay industrialization. We show that an elite landed class chooses to democratize society only after the economy has accumulated enough wealth.
Keywords: Autocracy; Democracy; Landed Elites; Growth Miracles; Vested Interests
44 pages, May 27, 2010
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wp10_07.pdf
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