Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Umeå Economic Studies,
Umeå University, Department of Economics

No 468: Auctioned and Re-auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden

Mats Bergman () and Sofia Lundberg ()
Additional contact information
Mats Bergman: Department of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Business, Box 6501, S 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Sofia Lundberg: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden

Abstract: During the 19th century, poor and orphan Swedish children were boarded out. The foster-parents' compensation was determined in English auctions. Some children were re-auctioned. We use historical data from such auctions to study whether informational asymmetry and possibly adverse selection affected the outcome in the market for re-auctioned children. The empirical findings are consistent with adverse selection.

Keywords: Adverse selection; asymmetric information; common value; English auction; private values

JEL-codes: D44; N33

29 pages, May 13, 1998

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