Sven-Olov Daunfeldt () and Xavier de Luna ()
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Sven-Olov Daunfeldt: The Swedish Research Institute of Trade (HUI), Postal: SE 103 29 Stockholm, Sweden
Xavier de Luna: Department of Statistics, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Abstract: In this paper, we use a non-parametric regression method to compare the transition process from high to low inflation with the implementation dates of central bank independence reforms. In a majority of the countries, price stability is achieved before more independence is given to the central bank. This suggests that the credibility of a low inflation goal can be achieved without institutional reforms which grant the central bank more independence from the political policymakers.
Keywords: Central bank reform; inflation targeting; monetary policy; non-parametric decomposition
14 pages, First version: September 5, 2002. Revised: June 12, 2003.
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