Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Umeå Economic Studies,
Umeå University, Department of Economics

No 795: Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings Among Women in First and Second Marriages

Johanna Åström (), Robert A. Nakosteen (), Olle Westerlund () and Michael A. Zimmer ()
Additional contact information
Johanna Åström: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Robert A. Nakosteen: Department of Finance & Operations Management, Postal: Isenberg School of Management, 121 Presidents Drive, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA,
Olle Westerlund: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Michael A. Zimmer: The Schroeder Family School of Business, Postal: Administration University of Evansville 1800 Lincoln Ave Evansville, IN 47722, USA

Abstract: This study examines spousal matching for females in second-order marriages. It is based on detailed data from longitudinal Swedish population data registers. We aim to follow women who marry, divorce, and subsequently remarry compared with females who marry and stay married over the course of the study interval. The earnings of both groups are modeled through regression analysis in the year prior to their marriages along with the earnings of each husband. The residuals from the regressions represent unobservables in the process of earnings generation. From the regressions we obtain spouse-to-be pairs of earnings residuals and we measure the correlation of residuals for each marital regime. Overall, we find significant positive correlations for all three of the marital partitions. The correlation tends to be smaller for the first of a sequence of marriages for women who divorce than for women who marry and stay so. For the second of the successive marriages, however, the correlation of the residuals is larger than that for women who marry but once. We also find evidence of “matching” between successive husbands. Women who marry men with unmeasured positive earnings capacities, in the event of divorce, tend to select and match in a similar fashion the second time around.

Keywords: Marital matching; Remarriage; Assortative mating; Earnings

JEL-codes: J12

28 pages, November 30, 2009

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