Thomas Aronsson () and David Granlund ()
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Thomas Aronsson: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
David Granlund: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Abstract: This paper deals with the optimal provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model, when the consumers have present-biased preferences due to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The results show that the preference for immediate gratification facing the (mimicking) high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust the public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.
Keywords: Public Goods; Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting; Redistribution; Asymmetric Information
7 pages, June 21, 2010
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