Thomas Aronsson () and Lars Persson ()
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Thomas Aronsson: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Lars Persson: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Abstract: This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.
Keywords: Optimal taxation; redistribution; public goods; fiscal federalism; decentralized leadership; horizontal leadership
8 pages, February 23, 2012
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