David Sundström: Department of Economics, Umeå School of Business and Economics, Postal: Umeå University, S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Abstract: A novel method to measure bidders’ costs (valuations) in descending (ascending) auctions is introduced. Based on two bounded rationality constraints bidders’ costs (valuations) are given an imperfect measurements interpretation that is robust to behavioral deviations from the traditional rationality assumptions. Theory provides no guidance as to the shape of the cost (valuation) distributions while empirical evidence suggests them to be positively skew. Consequently, a flexible distribution is employed in an imperfect measurements framework. An illustration of the proposed method on Swedish public procurement data is provided along with a comparison to a traditional Bayesian Nash Equilibrium approach.
16 pages, First version: November 13, 2014. Revised: June 17, 2016. Earlier revisions: October 5, 2015.
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