Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Paper Series,
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
No 1998:1: A Firm Bargaining with Many Workers
Andreas Westermark ()
Additional contact information
Andreas Westermark: Department of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze bargaining between a firm and a finite set of workers. In particular employment choice and the payoffs in equilibrium are studied. In the model, the firm first selects the workers it wants to hire. The selected workers then decide whether they want to proceed in bargaining with the firm. Finally, bargaining takes place. In contrast to Stole & Zweibel (1996), we assume that contracts are binding. The payoff for a worker is given by a share of the contribution to production, treating all other workers as employed, in addition to the worker's outside option.
Keywords: bargaining; labor demand
25 pages, January 14, 1998
- Published as
- Andreas Westermark, (2003), 'Bargaining, Binding Contracts and Competitive Wages', Games and Economic Behavior, vol 43, no 2, pages 296-311
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