Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Paper Series,
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
No 1998:11: The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory
Martin Dufwenberg (), Henk Norde, Hans Reijnierse and Stef Tijs
Additional contact information
Martin Dufwenberg: Department of Economics, Postal: Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Henk Norde: Department of Econometrics, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands,
Hans Reijnierse: Department of Econometrics, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Stef Tijs: CentER for Economic Research, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Abstract: We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
Keywords: Consistency; set-valued solutions; normative game theory
JEL-codes: C72
18 pages, May 7, 1998
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