Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Uppsala University, Department of Economics

No 1998:11: The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory

Martin Dufwenberg (), Henk Norde, Hans Reijnierse and Stef Tijs
Additional contact information
Martin Dufwenberg: Department of Economics, Postal: Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Henk Norde: Department of Econometrics, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands,
Hans Reijnierse: Department of Econometrics, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Stef Tijs: CentER for Economic Research, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

Abstract: We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

Keywords: Consistency; set-valued solutions; normative game theory

JEL-codes: C72

18 pages, May 7, 1998

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Published as
Martin Dufwenberg, Henk Norde, Hans Reijnierse and Stef Tijs, (2001), 'The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory', Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, vol 54, no 1, pages 119-131

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