Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Uppsala University, Department of Economics

No 2001:2: A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value

Mark Voorneveld and Sofia Grahn
Additional contact information
Mark Voorneveld: CentER and Department of Econometrics, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands,
Sofia Grahn: Department of Economics, Postal: Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden

Abstract: A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

Keywords: Convex game; unanimity game; Shapley value; axiomatization

JEL-codes: C71

8 pages, February 1, 2001

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2001wp2.pdf PDF-file 

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