Per Engström (), Ann-Sofie Kolm () and Che-Yuan Liang ()
Additional contact information
Per Engström: Department of Economics, Postal: Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Ann-Sofie Kolm: Department of Economics, Postal: Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Che-Yuan Liang: Department of Economics, Postal: Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Abstract: The increased demand for a more equal parental sharing of the responsibilities for children has led many countries to reconstruct their parental leave systems so to provide stronger incentives for fathers to participate in childcare. Father’s quotas are becoming widely spread across Europe. This paper provides arguments for why it may be welfare improving for both parents to increase the father’s share of the family’s parental leave time. However, regulations in terms of father’s quotas may not be optimal since it fails to recognise potentially heterogenous preferences. Instead, self-commitment devices should be provided in order to prevent mothers from taking too large share of the family’s leave time.
Keywords: Parental leave; Hyperbolic discounting; Addiction
18 pages, November 17, 2006
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