Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Uppsala University, Department of Economics

No 2007:28: Is There an Incumbency Advantage or a Cost of Ruling in Proportional Election Systems?

Che-Yuan Liang ()
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Che-Yuan Liang: Department of Economics, Postal: Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of political representation on the electoral outcome at the party level in a proportional multiparty election system using data from Swedish local government elections. There are two notions of representation in a council; the first is to hold seats, and the second is to belong to the ruling coalition. I refer to the effect of the former as the incumbency effect and the effect of the latter as the effect of ruling. To identify causal effects, I use the discontinuous variations in the number of seats and ruling (as a coalition receives a majority of the seats) to isolate exogenous variation in incumbency and ruling respectively. I find an advantage of 0.11 percent of the votes for each percent of incumbency. 11 percent of the votes in an election are therefore determined by incumbency, a figure close to the advantage found in majoritarian systems. However, the advantage differs significantly between parties. Further, I find no effects of ruling, contrary to the commonly found cost of ruling in proportional systems.

Keywords: incumbency advantage; cost of ruling; proportional elections; multiparty systems; local governments; regression-discontinuity

JEL-codes: D72; D73

20 pages, December 19, 2007

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