Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Uppsala University, Department of Economics

No 2010:2: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Susanne Ek and Bertil Holmlund ()
Additional contact information
Susanne Ek and Bertil Holmlund: Department of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden

Abstract: The paper develops an equilibrium search and matching model where two-person families as well as singles participate in the labor market. We show that equilibrium entails wage dispersion among equally productive risk-averse workers. Marital status as well as spousal labor market status matter for wage outcomes. In general, employed members of two-person families receive higher wages than employed singles. The model is applied to a welfare analysis of alternative unemployment insurance systems, recognizing the role of spousal employment as partial substitute for public insurance. The optimal system involves benefit differentiation based on marital status as wellas spousal labor market status. Optimal differentiation yields small welfare gains but gives rise to large wage differentials.

Keywords: Job search; wage bargaining; wage differentials; unemployment; unemployment insurance

JEL-codes: J31; J64; J65

30 pages, January 27, 2010

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