Working Paper Series,
Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper compares the runoff system and the plurality rule in terms of the size and composition of public expenditures. I use the change in the voting rule in Italian municipalities at 15,000 residents to implement a regression discontinuity design. The results show that municipalities under the runoff system spend at least 20 percent more than those under the plurality rule, and that this effect is primarily driven by a large increase in administrative spending. Additionally, the greater number of candidates and the larger coalitions indicate lower accountability under the runoff system than under the plurality rule.

Keywords: Voting rules; Fiscal policy; Runoff; Plurality; Regression discontinuity design

JEL-codes: D72; E02; H39; H50

45 pages, October 11, 2018

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