Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
CAFO Working Papers,
Linnaeus University, Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics
No 2009:4: Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information
Klas Sandén ()
Additional contact information
Klas Sandén: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), Postal: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), Dept of Economics and Statistics, School of Management and Economics, Växjö University , SE 351 95 Växjö, Sweden
Abstract: This paper makes a theoretical contribution by investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Copyright; Reward system; Legislation
25 pages, September 26, 2008
Full text files
Nek_wp4_09.pdf
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