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The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

No 714:
Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Geir Asheim, Mark Voorneveld () and Jörgen W. Weibull

Abstract: This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

Keywords: epistemic game theory; epistemic robustness; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; D83; (follow links to similar papers)

16 pages, March 30, 2009

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