Working Paper Series
IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy
Monitoring sickness insurance claimants: evidence from a social experiment
(), Per Johansson
() and Laura Larsson
Abstract: The paper exploits a unique social experiment carried out
in 1988 in Sweden to identify the effect of monitoring on sickness absence.
The treatment consists of postponing the first formal point of monitoring
during a sickness absence spell, a requirement for a doctor’s certificate,
from day eight to day fifteen. The experiment was conducted in two
geographical areas, and the treatment group was randomized by birth date.
The results show strong effects on sickness absence duration from extending
the waiting period in both areas. On average, the durations increased by
6.6 percent. No effect on incidence of sickness absence is found. A
heterogeneity analysis reveals that monitoring affects men more than
Keywords: Absenteeism; sickness insurance; monitoring; social experiment; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: H55; I18; J22; J28; (follow links to similar papers)
32 pages, June 19, 2005
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- This paper is published as:
Hesselius, Patrik, Per Johansson and Laura Hartman, (2013), 'Effects of eligibility screening in the sickness insurance: Evidence from a field experiment', Labour Economics, Vol. 20, January, pages 48-56
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