Working Paper Series
IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy
Gerard J. van den Berg and Johan Vikström
Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality
Abstract: Unemployment insurance systems include monitoring of
unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are
violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality,
notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction
leads to a lower occupational level. The data cover the Swedish population
over 1999–2004. We estimate duration models dealing with selection on
unobservables. We use weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to
deal with the fact that the data register is large whereas observed
punishments are rare. We also develop a theoretical job search model with
monitoring of job offer rejection versus monitoring of job search effort.
The observation window includes a discontinuous policy change in which the
punishment severity was reduced. We find that the hourly wage and the
number of hours are lower after a sanction, and that individuals move more
often to a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.
Monitoring offer rejections is less effective than monitoring search
Keywords: Unemployment; duration; sanction; wage; hours worked; weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood; case worker; job offer; offer rejection; search effort; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C21; C41; J31; J44; J62; J64; J65; (follow links to similar papers)
55 pages, August 19, 2009
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- This paper is published as:
van den Berg, Gerard J. and Johan Vikström, (2014), 'Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality', The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, February, No. 2, pages 284-334
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