Anders Poulsen: Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Abstract: We study a simple evolutionary bargaining game and show that the efficiency of bargaining behavior can depend crucially on the tie breaking rule players use. In fact, in a certain limit all the surplus is wasted. Inefficiency arises for any role assignment procedure, as long as there is some probability that two players are assigned to the same role. We also give results on the relationship between inefficiency and spitefulness.
9 pages, November 1, 2003
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helle Vinbaek Stenholt ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-23 23:30:45.