Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working papers in Transport Economics,
CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI)

No 2011:13: Why are bids not more unbalanced?

Svante Mandell () and Johan Nyström ()
Additional contact information
Svante Mandell: VTI, Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Johan Nyström: VTI, Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: Earlier theoretical models of unbalanced bidding in unit price contracts (UPC) ofter predict corner solutions, i.e. zero bids for unit prices of expected overextimated quantities. However, anecdotal evidence indicates a lack of zero bids in the actual contracts. We pursue a possible explanation for this anomaly in risk-aversion of the contractor. Using a simple model we show that a contractor with superior information may exploit this in the bidding process to increase her expectd revenue. However, in so doing she increases her risk exposure. If the contractor is risk-averse, she typically will avoid a corner solution to this risk vs. expected return trade-off.

Keywords: Unbalanced bidding; risk; modelling; unit price contraction; public procurement

JEL-codes: D82; D86; H51; L51

12 pages, November 2, 2011

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CTS2011-13.pdf PDF-file 

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