Svante Mandell (), Jan-Eric Nilsson () and Inge Vierth ()
Additional contact information
Svante Mandell: KTH and VTI, Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Jan-Eric Nilsson: VTI, Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Inge Vierth: VTI, Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: The impact of policy instruments supposed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from road freight transports may seem smaller than expected. Using insights from economics and contract theory, the paper sorts out the (possible) instances of market failure in the freight transport market; operator market power, asymmetric information split incentives, and public goods. The primary limitations of standard policy instruments are demonstrated to be linked to unobservable information. Some of these may be reduced but not eliminated as information technologies develop, making it possible to observe, verify and provide contract-relevant information to the uninformed parties. There is little reason to believe that possible market failures present major limitations to the efficiency of economic instruments geared toward protecting the climate, other than possibly in the short run
Keywords: Freight transport; Climate; Greenhouse gas; Policy instruments; Asymmetric information; Split incentives
JEL-codes: R40
25 pages, March 25, 2014
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CTS2014-5.pdf
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