Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working papers in Transport Economics,
CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI)

No 2016:20: Contract design and performance of railway maintenance: effects of incentive intensity and performance incentive schemes

Kristofer Odolinski ()
Additional contact information
Kristofer Odolinski: VTI, Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: In this paper we study the effect of contract design on the performance of railway maintenance in Sweden, using a panel data set over the period 2003-2013. The marginal effect of incentive intensity is estimated, showing that the power of incentive schemes improve performance as measured by the number of infrastructure failures. In addition, the performance incentive schemes result in a reallocation of effort from failures not causing train delays to failures causing train delays

Keywords: Contract design; Incentive intensity; Maintenance; Railways

JEL-codes: D82; L92

39 pages, September 28, 2016

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