Kristofer Odolinski: VTI, Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: In this paper we study the effect of contract design on the performance of railway maintenance in Sweden, using a panel data set over the period 2003-2013. The marginal effect of incentive intensity is estimated, showing that the power of incentive schemes improve performance as measured by the number of infrastructure failures. In addition, the performance incentive schemes result in a reallocation of effort from failures not causing train delays to failures causing train delays
39 pages, September 28, 2016
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