, Mark Voorneveld
() and Jörgen W. Weibull
Geir Asheim: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Mark Voorneveld: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Jörgen W. Weibull: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.
16 pages, March 30, 2009
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