Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

No 489: Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games

Jörgen W. Weibull
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Jörgen W. Weibull: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population(s). Some main features of this approach are here outlined, and connections with learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and equilibrium are discussed. Some desiderata and results for robust long-run predictions are considered.

Keywords: Games

JEL-codes: C70; C72

10 pages, October 1997

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