Jörgen W. Weibull () and Eric van Damme
Jörgen W. Weibull: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P O Box 5501, SE-114 85 Stockholm, Sweden
Eric van Damme: Center for Economic Research, Postal: Tilbury University, P O Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Abstract: Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intented. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2 x 2-coordination games.
15 pages, August 17, 1998
Full text files
iuiwop0501.pdf.zip Full text
iuiwop0501.pdf Full text
iuiwop0501.ps.zip PostScript file Full text
iuiwop0501.ps PostScript file Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2022-09-03 20:59:58.