Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

No 531: Visits to the Client when Tendering for Consulting Contracts: Sourcing Information or Influencing the Client?

Roger Svensson ()
Additional contact information
Roger Svensson: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: Consulting firms (CFs) sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts. One frequently used strategy by CFs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders. The reason to the visits is either: 1) to influence the client in his decision-making in some sense; or 2) to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted. Using a unique database on individual proposals, I examine empirically which of these two reasons is the most important. The estimations suggest that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits.

Keywords: Consulting services; Procurement; Visits; Information sourcing; Lobbying; Marketing

JEL-codes: F23; L14; L84; M31

18 pages, March 10, 2000

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