Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: In intermediate goods markets, both buyers and sellers normally have market power, and sales are based on bilaterally negotiated contracts specifying both price and quantity. In our model, pairs of buyers and sellers meet in bilateral but interdependent Rubinstein-Ståhl negotiations. The outcome has a simple characterization (a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargaining solutions) suitable for applied work. Equilibrium quantities are efficient regardless of concentration and also with few “trading links”. The law of one price does not hold. In addition to relation-specific characteristics, prices depend on both upstream and downstream concentration and on the structure of trading links. The requirements necessary for Walrasian prices are stronger than usually believed.

Keywords: Bilageral Oligopoly; Bargaining; Intermediate Goods; Decentralized Trade; Walrasian Outcome

JEL-codes: C70; D20; D40; L10; L40

42 pages, April 27, 2001

Full text files

WP555.pdf  

Download statistics

• Research Institute of Industrial Economics
• Ordering Working Papers
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0555This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:15:48.