Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy.

Keywords: Political Parties; Campaigning

JEL-codes: C72; D72; D89

42 pages, November 20, 2001

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Published as

Andreas Westermark, (2004), 'Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises; Published with the title Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity', Games and Economic Bahavior, vol 47, no 2, pages 421-452

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