Assar Lindbeck (), Sten Nyberg () and Jörgen W. Weibull ()
Assar Lindbeck: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Sten Nyberg: Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Jörgen W. Weibull: Boston University, Postal: Department of Economics, 270 Bay State Road, Boston MA 02215, USA
Abstract: The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.
14 pages, November 15, 2002
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2022-09-03 20:59:58.