Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

No 621: Do Mergers Result in Collusion?

Mattias Ganslandt () and Pehr-Johan Norbäck ()
Additional contact information
Mattias Ganslandt: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Pehr-Johan Norbäck: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition, statistical tests reject the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions result in "coordinated effects". In particular, higher market concentration does not result in more collusive behavior and, consequently, the relevance of simple "checklists" in merger control can be questioned.

Keywords: Merger Control; Collusion; Coordinated Effects; Oligopolistic Dominance; Competition Policy

JEL-codes: D43; L13; L41

34 pages, June 14, 2004

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