Tobias Lindqvist: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Theoretically, cross ownership may mitigate mergers, i.e. market concentrations. Holding a share in a competing firm before the acquisition of another firm, outsider-toehold, is more profitable in some market constellations, due to the positive externality on the outsider (competing) firm when a merger occurs. The purposes of this paper are to empirically observe when US firms buy outsider-toeholds and through event-studies estimate the gains of buyers, outsider firms and competitors when firms holding outsider-toeholds merge.
29 pages, January 24, 2005
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