Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics
No 691: Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution may Benefit the TV-viewers
Johan Stennek ()
Additional contact information
Johan Stennek: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded
Keywords: Exclusive Contracts; Quality; Bargaining; Avertising; Investment
44 pages, January 9, 2007
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