(), Sven-Olof Fridolfsson
(), Chloé Le Coq
() and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Maria Bigoni: IMT-Lucca
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Chloé Le Coq: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economies, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics
Giancarlo Spagnolo: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, Tor Vergata University and CEPR
Abstract: This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate harsher times after defections as leniency reduces recidivism and lowers post-conviction prices. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal law enforcement.
40 pages, First version: April 24, 2008. Revised: August 6, 2009.
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-23 23:34:34.