Pär Holmberg () and David Newbery
Pär Holmberg: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
David Newbery: Faculty of Economics, Postal: University of Cambridge, U.K.
Abstract: The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry. Previous results and general recommendations for divisible-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format; setting the reservation price; the rationing rule; and restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions.
45 pages, November 5, 2009
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