Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

No 877: Political Preferences and Public Sector Outsourcing

Mikael Elinder () and Henrik Jordahl ()
Additional contact information
Mikael Elinder: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Henrik Jordahl: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: There are several theoretical accounts of public sector outsourcing. We note that leading theories give different predictions of the influence of political variables and test the predictions on a Swedish data set in which outsourcing varies between municipalities and over time as well as between services. Our identification strategy focuses on two services with similar contracting problems and local market conditions: preschools and primary schools. We study a period in which Swedish municipalities had full discretion in the provision of preschools, while their influence on the provision of primary education was limited by a national voucher system. The comparison of preschools and primary schools in a difference-in-differences model suggests that the political color of the ruling majority matters for outsourcing, which is consistent with the citizen candidate model of representative democracy.

Keywords: Outsourcing; Ideology; Public provision; Contracting out

JEL-codes: D23; H11; H40; L33

Language: English

23 pages, July 4, 2011

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Published as
Mikael Elinder and Henrik Jordahl, (2013), 'Political Preferences and Public Sector Outsourcing', European Journal of Political Economy, vol 30, pages 43-57

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