Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

No 1097: An Extended N-player Network Game and Simulation of Four Investment Strategies on a Complex Innovation Network

Wen Zhou (), Nikita Koptyug (), Shutao Ye , Yifan Jia and Xiaolong Lu
Additional contact information
Wen Zhou: School of Computer Engineering and Science, Postal: Shanghai University, Shanghai, China, and Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern Institute on Complex Systems (NICO), Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States of America
Nikita Koptyug: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Shutao Ye: School of Computer Engineering and Science, Postal: Shanghai University, Shanghai, China
Yifan Jia: School of Computer Engineering and Science, Postal: Shanghai University, Shanghai, China
Xiaolong Lu: School of Computer Engineering and Science, Postal: Shanghai University, Shanghai, China

Abstract: As computer science and complex network theory develop, non-cooperative games and their formation and application on complex networks have been important research topics. In the inter-firm innovation network, it is a typical game behavior for firms to invest in their alliance partners. Accounting for the possibility that firms can be resource constrained, this paper analyzes a coordination game using the Nash bargaining solution as allocation rules between firms in an inter-firm innovation network. We build an extended inter-firm n-player game based on nonidealized conditions, describe four investment strategies and simulate the strategies on an inter-firm innovation network in order to compare their performance. By analyzing the results of our experiments, we find that our proposed greedy strategy is the best-performing in most situations. We hope this study provides a theoretical insight into how firms make investment decisions.

Keywords: Complex Networks; Game Theory; Innovation; Innovation Network; Nash Equilibrium

JEL-codes: C72; C81; C82; D81; L14

27 pages, December 15, 2015

Full text files

wp1097.pdf PDF-file 

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

This page generated on 2018-01-23 23:34:49.