(), Per Skedinger
() and Roope Uusitalo
Petri Böckerman: Turku School of Economics, Labour Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki a
Per Skedinger: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Roope Uusitalo: Jyväskylä University School of Business and Economics
Abstract: We construct a multi-country employer-employee data to examine the consequences of employment protection. We identify the effects by comparing worker exit rates between units of the same firm that operate in two countries that have different seniority rules. The results show that last-in-first-out rules reduce dismissals of older, more senior workers, especially in shrinking multinational firms, and increase their bargaining power, resulting in a steeper seniority-wage profile.
35 pages, January 8, 2016
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