Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

No 1351: Competition for Flexible Distribution Resources in a ’Smart’ Electricity Distribution Network

Thomas Tangerås ()
Additional contact information
Thomas Tangerås: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: In a ’smart’ electricity distribution network, flexible distribution resources (FDRs) can be coordinated to improve efficiency. But coordination enables whoever controls such resources to exercise market power. The paper establishes the following efficiency rankings of market structures: Aggregators competing for FDRs are more efficient than a distribution system operator (DSO) controlling resources, which is more efficient than no FDR market. A no- market solution is more efficient than an FDR market featuring either (i) both DSO and aggregators; or (ii) a monopoly aggregator also supplying generation to the real-time market. The paper also characterizes a regulation that implements the efficient outcome.

Keywords: Aggregator; Distribution system operator; Market power; Real-time market; Regulation; Smart grid

JEL-codes: H41; L12; L51; L94

30 pages, August 20, 2020

Full text files

wp1351.pdf PDF-file Full text

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

This page generated on 2021-10-19 15:39:07.