() and Thomas Tangerås
Henrik Horn: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Thomas Tangerås: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: This paper develops a framework for analyzing the incentives of national transmission system operators (TSOs) to supply cross-border interconnection capacity in an international electricity market. Our results show that equilibrium transmission capacity is downward distorted, even in situations where full capacity utilization is inefficient. We derive a method for quantifying these distortions and propose a market design that uniquely implements efficient dispatch of electricity. In this design, the distribution of trade adjustment payments causes TSOs to internalize the full e¤ect of network congestion. The design would improve, for instance, on the current European market design.
41 pages, June 21, 2021
Full text files
wp1394.pdf Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2021-10-19 15:39:07.