Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Populists typically frame politics as a conflict between a corrupt elite and a virtuous people and are skeptical of institutional constraints, including those protecting freedom of expression, as they seek to control the public narrative. We ask to what extent de jure constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression constrain such actors and when speech can be de facto curtailed despite formal protections, with a particular focus on emergency derogation clauses. We explore these questions in panel data for 75 countries with multi-party systems between 1970 and 2020. Findings show that right-wing populist representation is associated with lower de facto freedom of expression, but mainly where the constitution offers an opt-out in emergencies or fails to impose clear non-emergency limits on restrictions of expression. These findings demonstrate that constitutional design and populist influence jointly determine the extent to which constitutional promises of free expression are honored in practice.

Keywords: Freedom of expression; Constitutional constraints; Constitutional compliance; Populism; Media freedom

JEL-codes: K00; P16; P50

Language: English

45 pages, April 1, 2026

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