Håkan Holm ()
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Håkan Holm: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: Our main conclusion is that the demand for information services that facilitate statistical screening between profitable and unprofitable sellers is highly sensitive to the market structure. A monopsonist will use information more extensively than would two or more buyers on the same market. We also show that information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will influence the demand on information. In equilibrium only the best information service will be used.
Keywords: Screening; Information Service; Market Behavior
25 pages, September 15, 1999
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