Tommy Andersson (tommy.andersson@nek.lu.se)
Additional contact information
Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract: This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy-free core to be non-empty.
Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing; Budget-Balance; Cooperative Game
JEL-codes: C71; D31; D63; D82; I38
14 pages, First version: November 5, 2004. Revised: January 12, 2006.
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