Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

No 2005:15: Absence of Absenteeism and Overtime work – Signaling Factors for Temporary Workers?

Anna Meyer () and Mårten Wallette ()
Additional contact information
Anna Meyer: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Mårten Wallette: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

Abstract: According to theories of screening and signaling, a temporary worker who shows effort should increase the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. We use two types of signals of effort: overtime and low levels of absenteeism to investigate i) whether temporary workers show more effort and ii) whether effort has a positive effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. We find that temporary workers have lower levels of absenteeism than permanent ones, but also lower levels of overtime work. Effort has little effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. However, using a competing risks model we find that working overtime decreases the probability of becoming unemployed.

Keywords: Temporary jobs; signals; absenteeism; overtime; exit; competing risk

JEL-codes: J20; J40; J69

27 pages, February 3, 2005

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WP05_15.pdf PDF-file 

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