Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

No 2005:37: Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion

Pär Torstensson
Additional contact information
Pär Torstensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

Abstract: We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies (NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a dynamic model which supports the refinements.

Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Neutrally stable strategies; ascending NSS; Eroding NSS.

JEL-codes: C73

23 pages, May 10, 2005

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