Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

No 2005:39: An n-person Rubinstein bargaining game

Pär Torstensson
Additional contact information
Pär Torstensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

Abstract: When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; n-person bargaining; subgame perfect equilibria

JEL-codes: C72; C78

5 pages, June 19, 2005

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