Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers,
Lund University, Department of Economics

No 2006:11: Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Tommy Andersson () and Lars-Gunnar Svensson ()
Additional contact information
Tommy Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

Abstract: This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Keywords: Indivisible objects; fairness; coalitionally strategy-proofness

JEL-codes: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78

11 pages, First version: May 3, 2006. Revised: December 4, 2007. Earlier revisions: April 12, 2007, April 12, 2007.

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